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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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1. Act of State Doctrine
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT PRECLUDE INQUIRY BY UNITED
STATES COURT INTO ALLEGED REPUDIATION BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OF ITS OBLIGATION ARISING FROM A PURELY COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTION

An Argentine industrial development bank cancelled letters of
credit payable at Italian and Swiss banks which it had issued in
favor of an Italian entrepreneur planning to relocate industrial
plants in Argentina. The bank alleged that the credits were cancelled pursuant to instructions of a government bank and the directions of the President of the Republic of Argentina. The entrepreneur's assignee, seeking damages for the expired credits,
moved for summary judgment dismissing the industrial bank's
Act of State doctrine defense. In granting plaintiff's motion, the
Supreme Court of New York found that the letters of credit were
cancelled because of alleged fraud on the part of the Italian entrepreneur, a purely commercial reason, and that this exercise of
power by the Argentine government was not peculiar to sovereigns, and therefore not protected by the Act of State doctrine.
The court observed that the cancellation was not pursuant to any
statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Argentine government
and, relying on Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) and Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir. 1977), concluded that extending the Act of State doc-
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trine to the repudiation of a commercial obligation would be inconsistent with the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. Citing
Dunhill, the court reasoned that even if the orders of the Argentine president and government bank were considered public acts,
there was no infringement of sovereignty in holding the Argentine
government to the same rules of law in its commercial capacity as
would apply to a private party in similarly engaged commercial
activities. The court concluded that because the directives of the
Swiss and Italian banks were extra-territorial in nature, under the
Act of State principles of Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897), it need not consider the validity of Argentine government
conduct within its own territory. Significance - This decision
clearly delineates an exception to the Act of State doctrine for
claims arising from purely commercial transactions with foreign
governments, and assures a judicial determination of the rights of
parties to those transactions whenever possible. Mirabella v.
Banco Industrial de la Republica Argentina, 101 Misc. 2d 767,
421 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
2. Admiralty
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION ExTENDs INLAND TO AUTOMOBILE AcciDENT CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF SHIP'S CREW

Cruise passenger, after disembarking from a three hour excursion promoted as a "booze cruise," was struck and seriously injured on a street adjoining the dock by an automobile driven by a
fellow passenger who was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the
accident. Organizers of the cruise filed suit in federal district
court to limit their potential liability under the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act. The injured passenger claimed that the
organizers of the cruise inadequately supervised passengers who
became illegally intoxicated while on board and failed to provide
a safe means of exit. The district court held that these claims
were not within the purview of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, stating
that the alleged negligent acts which led to the injury were sufficiently related to traditional maritime activities to meet the test
for admiralty jurisdiction. Relying on Guiterrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), the court held that admiralty jurisdiction is present when a tort committed on board ship by the crew
has an impact onshore at a time and place not remote from the
negligent act. The court distinguished Peytavin v. Government
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Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972), which denied
admiralty jurisdiction over an automobile accident in which
plaintiff's car was struck from behind by another while parked on
a floating pontoon at a ferry landing, on the basis of three factors.
First, the injured party in the present case was a passenger
aboard a commercial ship owned and operated by the defendants.
Second, the alleged negligence here involved the performance of
maritime duties by the ship's crew in caring for passengers. Last,
the sequence of causal events in the instant case started on board
the vessel and ended on land. Significance - Admiralty jurisdiction reaches an automobile accident on a municipal street as long
as the time and place of the injury are not remote from the tortious act and the tortious activity which caused the injury was
related to traditional maritime activities. Duluth SuperiorExcursions, Inc. v. Makela, 623 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1980).
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

LANDs ACT INCORPORATES THE LONG-

SHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT, AND INCLUDES

PROVISIONS DEPRIVING

CLAIMS BY OUTER

CONTINENTAL

SHELF EMPLOYEES INJURED ON THE JOB AGAINST VESSEL OWNERS
BASED UPON BREACH OF WARRANTY OF SEAWORTHINESS

A "wireline hand" injured when a steel pipe fell from a tool box
being transferred from a vessel to the top deck of a fixed oil platform located on the outer Continental Shelf instituted a negligence action against both the vessel's owner and the owner of the
tool box. Plaintiff amended his complaint to include a claim,
based upon general maritime law, for breach of warranty of seaworthiness against the owner of the vessel being off-loaded. Defendant vessel owner moved to dismiss the unseaworthiness
claim, arguing that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43
U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.) (OCSLA) incorporates the provisions of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (33
U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) (LHWCA) regarding legal redress for outer
Continental Shelf workers injured on the job. Defendant contended that plaintiff was an employee covered under the LHWCA
and that section 905(b) of that statute deprived him of a claim
against a vessel owner based upon unseaworthiness. Plaintiff
countered that section 905(b) was never intended to apply to the
outer Continental Shelf, and that the only LHWCA provision incorporated into the OCSLA concerned its compensation requirements. Finding that the LHWCA applied to outer Continental
Shelf employees, and the entire text of the LHWCA had been
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incorporated into the OCSLA, the district court concluded that
the OCSLA deprived plaintiff's claim against the vessel owner
based upon unseaworthiness. The court reasoned that the result
of adopting plaintiff's position would be to force vessel owners
faced with suits by employees of independent contractors to enforce indemnity agreements with the independent contractors.
Thus a situation would circumvent one of the express Congressional purposes in enacting the OSCLA provisions incorporating
the LHCWA, i.e., that compensation be the exclusive liability of
the employer to the employee. Significance - This is the first
reported case to confront the issue of whether an outer Continental Shelf employee injured on the job may assert a claim, under
the OSCLA, against a vessel owner based upon breach of warranty of seaworthiness. Cloud v. Union Oil Company of California, 481 F. Supp. 58 (1979).
3.

Aliens' Rights

RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF DOMICILE, WHICH PRECLUDES NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS FROM ATTAINING "IN-STATE" STAUNIVERSITY'S

TUS FOR TUITION PURPOSES, DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS

Nonimmigrant alien students, dependent on parents holding a
nonimmigrant visa granted to officers or employees of international treaty organizations, brought suit against the University of
Maryland and its president, alleging that the University's refusal
to allow them the opportunity to establish "in-state" status for
tuition purposes violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holding that the University's refusal constituted an "irrebuttable presumption of nondomicile" in violation of due process, the district court ruled in
favor of the students, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After finding the case "squarely
within Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) as limited by Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), to those situations in which a
state purports to be concerned with domicile, but at the same
time denies to one seeking to meet its test of domicile the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on that issue," the Court
remanded the case to the Maryland state court to determine
whether nonimmigrant aliens could become Maryland domiciliaries. The Maryland state court answered affirmatively and requested that the case be restored to the Supreme Court's active
docket. In the meantime, though, the University had adopted a
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more restrictive definition of domicile, including cost equalization
figures, which explicitly precluded nonimmigrant aliens from
"domiciliary" status. The Supreme Court then refused to hear the
case and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of subsequent opinions. While acknowledging that
the University's initial policy denied the students due process
under the "impermissible irrebuttable presumption" doctrine of
Vlandis, the district court found that the University's subsequent, more restrictive policy was constitutional because it is now
universally recognized that nonimmigrant aliens cannot qualify
for "in-state" status, and thus an "impermissible irrebuttable
presumption" no longer exists. Significance - This decision indicates the considerable leverage which courts are willing to afford
state universities in drafting tuition-related policies and in particular, those affecting nonimmigrant aliens. The decision also exposes the weakness of the Vlandis doctrine, made even more fragile by the Court's refusal to hear the case after the University's
restrictive policy change. Notably, the district court did not address whether the revised policy violated the Equal Protection or
Supremacy Clauses and ordered a conference to address those
points. Moreno v. Toll, 480 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Md. 1979).
4.

Jurisdiction and Procedure

OF FUNDS HELD IN TRUST IN UNITED
STATES BANK FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TO SECURE ENFORCEMENT
ORDER OF ATTACHMENT

OF JUDGMENT EXPECTED IN A PENDING CONTRACT ACTION IN THE
UNITED STATES NEEDS RECONSIDERATION WHEN EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECIPITATE RAPID CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THAT FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES

On June 13, 1979, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered an order attaching funds
held by a New York bank in trust for the Islamic Revolutionary
Council of Iran, in order to secure enforcement of a judgment expected in a contract action pending in the Northern District of
Texas between a United States corporation and an Iranian government agency. On November 28, 1979 after hearing an appeal
by the Revolutionary Council, the Second Circuit remanded the
case to the district court to reconsider its order in light of the
changing relationship between Iran and the United States due to
the seizure of United States hostages in Teheran. Specifically, the
Second Circuit recommended that the lower court reconsider: (1)
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the position of the Department of State as to the right of access
to United States courts of the Iranian government agency, (2) the
necessity for the district court's order in light of Exec. Order No.
12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (November 14, 1979), "freezing" Iranian assets in the United States, and (3) the district court's interpretation of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular
Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S.
No. 3853, in light of Department of State documents made available to the Second Circuit. Significance- This decision demonstrates the willingness of a prominent United States court to consider suspension of normal civil procedure in deference to the
Executive Branch when critical foreign relations issues so require.
Electronic Data Systems CorporationIran v. Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran, 610 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979).

